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Raise Human Knowledge

Idols and False Notions

Corruption by Preconceived Fancies

Degeneration Due to Credulity

Corruption by Abstraction, Superstition, and Theology

Need for Mature Suspension of Judgment

The Ultimate End of Knowledge

Dignity of Knowledge

The Need to Assist the Mind

Renewal of Science

Defects of Syllogistic Logic


Seeking a Foundation for Science

Help for the Senses

Indications for the Direction for Experiments

Deficiencies in Knowledge to be Remedied

The Art of Discourse





Francis Bacon (1561-1626 CE) was born in central London. His father was a  successful lawyer and his mother was a scholar, translating ecclesiastical material from Italian and Latin into English. At age twelve, Bacon entered Trinity College, Cambridge, with a desire for learning and knowledge. He found himself "amidst men of sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety of reading, their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors, chiefly Aristotle, their dictator. . . and knowing little history, either of nature or time, did, out of no great quantity of matter, and infinite agitation of wit, spin cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit."  One notices an antipathy to Aristotle in Bacon's subsequent writings.

Matriculating two years later, Bacon left Cambridge to become an attache to the English Ambassador in Paris. In  1579 his father died, and Bacon, having only a small income, returned to London to study law, being admitted to the bar in 1582. In 1584 he was elected to Parliament, and became known for his knowledge and strength in debates. He actively sought political preferment until in 1595 he was made a Queen's Counsel and employed on government business. By 1619 he had risen to the position of Lord Chancellor with the title Baron Verulam. In the same year he was found guilty of taking bribes in the exercise of his duties. Speaking of his trial by the House of Lords, Bacon, who denied that the bribes swayed his judgment, said "I was the justest judge that was in England these fifty years; but it was the justest censure that was in Parliament these two hundred years". Bacon died in 1626 from a fever, developing from a cold caught while testing the preservative properties of snow.

Bacon's ambition was to produce a new beginning for the investigation of  nature, entitled in Latin, Magna Instauratio. This was to be in six parts, but only the first two, The Advancement of Learning and the Novum Organum were completed. When published in 1605, the former was the first great prose work in English devoted to a secular subject, and surveyed the whole field of knowledge to identify deficits and hindrances to advancement, and to emphasize the dignity of knowledge and its true value. Bacon also published an expanded version in Latin, De Augmentis Scientiarum. In Novum Organum, published in 1620, Bacon set out his new method of advancing knowledge, specifically, by systematic observation, experiment, and the development of conclusions leading to intermediate principles that could be built upon by the same process to yield more basic principles. While he did not complete this ambitious project nor make significant scientific advances himself, his powerful advocacy of the scientific method opened the way for a renaissance in science in England. I have included extracts from these major works and also from non-scientific material.


Raise Human Knowledge

1    Francis of Verulam thought thus, and such is the method which he determined within himself, and which he thought it concerned the living and posterity to know.

Being convinced, by a careful observation, that the human understanding perplexes itself, or makes not a sober and advantageous use of the really helpful concepts within its reach, whence manifold ignorance and inconveniences arise, he was determined to employ his utmost endeavors towards restoring or cultivating a just and legitimate familiarity betwixt the mind and things. . . [suggested in The Great Learning]

And whilst men agree to admire and magnify the false powers of the mind, and neglect or destroy those that might be rendered true, there is no other course left but with better assistance to begin the work anew, and raise or rebuild the sciences, arts, and all human knowledge from a firm and solid basis.

Uncertain, however, whether these reflections would occur to an­other, and observing that he had never met any person disposed to apply his mind to similar thoughts, he determined to publish whatsoever he found time to perfect. Nor is this the haste of ambition, but anxiety, that if he should die there might remain behind him some outline and determination of the matter his mind had embraced, as well as some mark of his sincere and earnest affection to promote the happiness of mankind.


Idols and False Notions

2    The idols and false notions which have already preoccupied the human understanding, and are deeply rooted in it, not only so dominate men's minds that they become difficult of access, but even when access is obtained will again meet and trouble us in the renovation of the sciences, unless mankind when forewarned guard themselves with all possible care against them.

3    The idols of the tribe are inherent in human nature and the very tribe or race of man; for man's sense is falsely asserted to be the standard of things; on the contrary, all the perceptions both of the senses and the mind bear reference to man and not to the universe, and the human mind resembles those uneven mirrors which impart their own properties to different objects, from which rays are emitted and distort and disfigure them.

4    The idols of the den are those of each individual; for everybody (in addition to the errors common to the race of man) has his own individual den or cavern, which intercepts and corrupts the light of nature, either from his own peculiar and singular disposition, or from his education and intercourse with others, or from his reading and the authority acquired by those whom he reverences and admires, or from the different impressions produced on the mind, as it happens to be pre­occupied and predisposed, or equable and tranquil, and the like; so that the spirit of man (according to its several dispositions) is variable, confused, and, as it were, actuated by chance; and Heraclitus said truly that men search for knowledge in lesser worlds, and not in the greater or common world.

5    There are also idols formed by the reciprocal intercourse and society of man with man, which we call idols of the market, from the commerce and association of men with each other; for men converse by means of language, but words are formed at the will of the generality, and there arises from a bad and unapt formation of words a wonderful obstruction to the mind. Nor can the definitions and explanations with which learned men guard and protect themselves in some instances afford a complete remedy—words still manifestly force the understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies.

6    Lastly, there are idols which have crept into men's minds from the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from the perverted rules of demonstration, and these we denominate idols of the theatre: for we regard all the systems of philosophy hitherto received or imagined, as so many plays brought out and performed, creating fictitious and theatrical worlds. Nor do we speak only of the present systems, or of the philosophy and sects of the ancients, since nu­merous other plays of a similar nature can be still composed and made to agree with each other, the causes of the most contradictory errors being generally the same. Nor, again, do we allude merely to general systems, but also to many elements and axioms of sciences which have become inveterate by tradition, implicit credence, and neglect.


Corruption by Preconceived Fancies

7    Some men become attached to particular sciences and contemplations, either from supposing themselves the authors and inventors of them, or from having bestowed the greatest pains upon such subjects, and thus become most committed to them. If men of this description apply themselves to philosophy and contemplations of a universal nature, they wrest and corrupt them by their preconceived fancies—of which Aristotle affords us a signal instance, who made his natural philosophy completely subservient to his logic, and thus rendered it little more than useless and disputatious.


Degeneration Due to Credulity

8    Credulity in respect of certain authors, and making them dictators instead of consuls, is a principal cause that the sciences are no further advanced. For hence, though in mechanical arts, the first inventor falls short, time adds perfection; whilst in the sciences, the first author goes furthest, and time only abates or corrupts. Thus artillery, sailing, and printing, were grossly managed at first, but received improvement by time; whilst the philosophy and the sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates, Euclid, and Archimedes, flourished most in the original authors, and degenerated with time. The reason is that in the mechanic arts, the capacities and industry of many are collected together; whereas in sciences, the capacities and industry of many have been spent upon the invention of some one man, who has commonly been thereby rather obscured than illuminated. For as water ascends no higher than the level of the first spring, so knowledge derived from Aristotle will at most rise no higher again than the knowledge of Aristotle.

9    The human understanding, when any proposition has been once laid down (either from general admission and belief, or from the pleasure it affords), forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation; and although most cogent and abundant instances may exist to the contrary, yet either does not observe or despises them, or gets rid of and rejects them by some distinction, with violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of its first conclusions. It was well answered by him who has shown in a temple the votive tablets suspended by such as had escaped the peril of shipwreck, and was pressed as to whether he would then recognize the power of the gods, by an inquiry, "But where are the portraits of those who have perished in spite of their vows?" All superstition is much the same, whether it be that of astrology, dreams, omens, retributive judgment, or the like, in all of which the deluded believers observe events which are fulfilled, but neglect and pass over their failure, though it be much more common.


Corruption by Abstraction, Superstition, and Theology

10  The human understanding is, by its own nature, prone to abstraction, and supposes that which is fluctuating to be fixed. But it is better to dissect nature than to deal with it in the abstract; such was the method employed by the school of Democritus, which made greater progress in penetrating nature than the rest. It is best to consider matter, its conformation, and the changes of that conformation, its own action, and the law of this action or motion; for forms are a mere fiction of the human mind, unless you will call the laws of action by that name.

11  The corruption of philosophy by the mixing of it up with superstition and theology, is of a much wider extent, and is most injurious to it both as a whole and in parts. For the human understanding is no less vulnerable to the impressions of fancy, than to those of vulgar notions. The disputatious and sophistic school entraps the understanding, whilst the fanciful, bombastic and, as it were, poetical school, rather flatters it. There is a clear example of this among the Greeks, especially in Pythagoras—where, however, the superstition is coarse and overcharged—but it is more dangerous and refined in Plato and his school.


Need for Mature Suspension of Judgment

12  Another error is an impatience of doubting and a blind hurry of asserting without a mature suspension of judgment. For the two ways of contemplation are like the two ways of action so frequently mentioned by the ancients: the one plain and easy at first, but in the end impassable; the other rough and fatiguing in the entrance, but soon after fair and even. So in contempla­tion: if we begin with certainties, we shall end in doubts; but if we begin with doubts, and are patient in them, we shall end in certainties.

13  Another error lies in the manner of delivering knowledge, which is generally magisterial and peremptory, not ingenuous and open, but suited to gain belief without reflection. And in compendious treatises for practice, this form should not be disallowed; but in the true delivering of knowledge, both extremes are to be avoided: namely, that of Velleius the Epicurean, who feared nothing as much as the non-appearance of doubting ; and that of Socrates and the Academics, who ironically doubted of all things. But the true way is to propose things candidly, with more or less assurance, as they stand in a man's own judgment.


The Ultimate End of Knowledge

14  But the greatest error of all is mistaking the ultimate end of knowledge; for some men covet knowledge out of a natural curiosity and inquisitive temper; some to entertain the mind with variety and delight; some for ornament and reputation; some for victory and contention; many for profit and a livelihood; and only a few for employing the divine gift of reason to the use and benefit of mankind.

15  Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect; for nature is only subdued by submission, and that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause in practical science becomes the rule.


Dignity of Knowledge

16  Dignity of command is always proportional to the dignity of the commanded. To have command over brutes as a herdsman is a mean thing; to have command over children as a schoolmaster is a matter of small honor; and to have command over slaves is rather a disgrace than an honor. . .  But the command of knowledge is higher than the command over a free people, as being a command over the reason, opinion, and understanding of men, which are the noblest faculties of the mind that govern the will itself; for there is no power on earth that can set up a throne in the spirits of men but knowledge and learning;

17  To conclude. The dignity and excellence of knowledge and learning are what human nature most aspires to for the securing of immortality, which is also endeavored after by raising and ennobling families, by buildings, foundations, and monuments of fame, and is in effect the bent of all other human desires. But we see how much more durable the monuments of genius and learning are than those of the hand. The verses of Homer have continued above five and twenty hundred years without loss, in which time numberless palaces, temples, castles, and cities have been demolished and are fallen to ruin. It is impossible to have the true pictures or statues of Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar or the great personages of much later date, for the originals cannot last, and the copies must lose life and truth; but the images of men's knowledge remain in books, exempt from the injuries of time, and capable of perpetual renovation.


The Need to Assist the Mind

18  The unassisted hand and the understanding left to itself possess but little power. Effects are produced by the means of instruments and helpful mental concepts, which the understanding requires no less than the hand; and as instruments either promote or regulate the motion of the hand, so those that are applied to the mind prompt or protect the understanding.

19  The sole cause and root of almost every defect in the sciences is this, that while we falsely admire and extol the powers of the human mind, we do not search for its real aids to its working.

20  The subtilty of nature is far beyond that of sense or of the understanding; so that the specious meditations, specula­tions, and theories of mankind are but a kind of insanity, only there is no one to stand by and observe it.

21  And as the immense regions of the West Indies had never been discovered, if the use of the compass had not first been known, it is no wonder that the discovery and ad­vancement of arts hath made no greater progress, when the art of inventing and discovering the sciences remains hitherto unknown.


Renewal of Science

22  The present discoveries in science are such as lie immediately beneath the surface of common notions. It is necessary, however, to penetrate the more secret and remote parts of nature, in order to abstract both notions and axioms from things by a more certain and guarded method.

23  We have no sound notions either in logic or physics; substance, quality, action, passion, and existence are not clear notions; much less weight, buoyancy, density, tenuousness, moisture, dryness, generation, corruption, attraction, repulsion, element, matter, form, and the like. They are all fantastical and ill-defined.

24  It is in vain to expect any great progress in the sciences by the superposition  or grafting of new matters upon old. An renewal must be made from the very foundations, if we do not wish to revolve forever in a circle, making only some slight and contemptible progress.


Defects of Syllogistic Logic

25  The present system of logic rather assists in confirming and rendering inveterate the errors founded on vulgar notions than in searching after truth, and is therefore more hurtful than useful.

26  The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words; words are the signs of notions. If, therefore, the notions (which form the basis of the whole) be confused and carelessly abstracted from things, there is no solidity in the superstructure. Our only hope, then, is in genuine induction.

27  The logicians appear scarcely to have thought seriously of induction, passing it over with some slight notice, and hurrying on to the formulae of dispute. But we reject the syllogistic demonstra­tion, as being too confused, and letting nature escape from our hands. For, although nobody can doubt that those things which agree with the middle term agree with each other, which is a sort of mathematical certainty, nevertheless, there is this source of error, namely, that a syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, and words are but the tokens and signs of things. If, therefore, the notions of the mind (which are as it were the soul of words, and the basis of this whole structure and fabric) are badly and hastily abstracted from things, and vague, or not sufficiently defined and limited, or, in short, faulty (as they may be) in many other respects, the whole falls to the ground.

28  Although we would leave therefore to the syllogism, and such celebrated and applauded demonstrations, their jurisdiction over popular and speculative arts (for here we make no alteration) yet, in every thing relating to the nature of things, we make use of induction, both for our major and minor propositions. For we consider induction to be that form of demonstration which assists the senses, closes in upon nature, and presses on, and, as it were, mixes itself with action.



29  Hence also the order of demonstration is naturally reversed. For at present the matter is so managed that from the senses and particular objects they immediately fly to the greatest generalities, as the axes round which their disputes may revolve: all the rest is deduced from them intermediately—by a quick method we allow, but an abrupt one, not revealing nature, though easy and well suited to disputations. But, by our method, axioms, or principles, are raised up in gradual succession, so that we do not arrive at generalities until the end. And that which is most generalized is not merely notional but well defined, and really acknowledged by nature as well known to her, and cleaving to the very pith of things.

30  By far our greatest work, however, lies in the form of induction and the judgment arising from it. For the form of which the logicians speak, which proceeds by bare enumeration, is puerile, and its conclusions precarious, is exposed to danger from one contrary example, only considers what is habitual, and leads not to any final result.

31  The sciences, on the contrary, require a form of induction capable of explaining and separating experiments, and coming to a certain conclusion by a proper series of rejections and exclusions. If, however, the common judgment of the logicians has been so laborious, and has exercised such great wits, how much more must we labor in this which is drawn not only from the recesses of the mind, but from the very entrails of nature.


Seeking a Foundation for Science

32  Nor is this all, for we go down to a greater depth, and render more solid the very foundations of the sciences, and we take up the beginning of our investigation from a higher part than men have yet done, by subjecting those matters to examination which common logic receives upon the credit of others. For the logicians borrow the principles of one science from another, in the next place they worship the first formed notions of their minds, and, lastly, they rest contented with the immediate information of the senses, if well directed. But we have resolved that true logic ought to enter upon the several provinces of the sciences with a greater command than is possessed by their first principles, and to force those supposed principles to an account of the grounds upon which they are clearly determined. As regards, the first notions of the understanding, not any of the materials which the understanding when left to itself has collected is unsuspected by us; nor will we confirm them unless they themselves are put on their trial and judged accordingly. Again, we have many ways of sifting the information of the senses themselves: for the senses assuredly deceive, though at the same time they disclose their errors. The errors, how­ever, are close at hand, whilst discoveries must be sought at a greater distance.


Help for the Senses

33  To meet these difficulties, we have everywhere sought and collected aids for the senses with laborious and faithful service, in order to supply defects and correct errors: and that not so much by means of instruments as by experiments. For experiments are much more delicate than the senses themselves, even when aided by instruments, at least if they are skillfully and scientifically imagined and applied to the required point. We attribute but little, therefore, to the immediate and proper perception of the senses. But reduce the matter to this, that they should decide on the experiment and the experiment should decide our findings on the subject of it.


Indications for the Direction for Experiments

34  And this we say, not to detract from the human mind, or to say that its work should be ignored, but that proper assistances may be obtained and provided to the understanding, whereby to conquer the difficulties of things and the obscurities of nature. What we endeavor is that the mind, by the help of art, may become equal to things, and that we may find a certain art of indication or direction to disclose and bring other arts to light, together with their axioms and effects. And this art we, upon just ground, report as deficient.

35  This art of indication has two parts; for indication proceeds, one, from experiment to experiment or, two, from experiments to new principles or axioms, which may in turn point out new experiments. The former we call learned experience, and the latter the interpretation of nature, Novum Organum, or new machine for the mind.


Deficiencies in Knowledge to be Remedied

36  The Coast of the New Intellectual World

A Recapitulation of the Deficiencies of Knowledge, Pointed out in the Preceding Work, to be Supplied by Posterity

The History of Monsters, or irregular productions of nature, in all the three kingdoms—vegetable, animal, and mineral.

The History of Arts, or nature formed and wrought by human industry.

A well-purged History of Nature in her extent, or the phenomena of the universe.

Inductive History, or historical matters consequentially deduced from phenomena, facts, observations, experiments, arts, and the active sciences.

A Universal Literary History, or the affairs relating to learning and knowledge, in all ages and countries of the world. Biography, or the lives of all eminent persons.

The History of Prophecy, or the accomplishment of divine predictions, to serve as a guide in the interpretation of prophecies.

The Philosophy of the Ancient Fables, or a just interpretation of the mythology of the ancients.

Primary Philosophy, or a collection of general axioms, subservient to all the sciences.

Physical Astronomy, or a philosophical history of the heavens.

A Just Astrology, or the real effects of the celestial bodies upon the terrestrial.

A Calendar of Doubts, or natural problems, to be continued through all ages, along with a calendar of vulgar errors.

A Collection of the Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers.

An Inquiry into the Simple Forms of Things, or that which constitutes their essences and differences.

Natural Magic, relative to the doctrine of forms.

An Inventory of Knowledge, or an account of the stock of learning among mankind.

A Calendar of leading Experiments, for the better interpretation of nature.

Short and commodious Methods of Calculation, in business, astronomy, etc.

The Doctrine of Gesture, or the motions of the body, with a view to their interpretation.

Comparative Anatomy between Different Human Bodies.

A work upon Incurable Diseases, to lessen their number, and fix a true notion of incurable in medicine.

The Laudable Means of procuring easy Deaths.

A set of approved and effectual Remedies for Diseases.

The Ways of Imitating Natural Springs and Bath Waters.

The Filum Medicinale, or Physician's Clue in Prescription.

A Natural Philosophy fundamental to Physic.

The Ways of Prolonging Life.

An Inquiry into the Nature and Substance of the sensitive Soul.

The Doctrine of Muscular Motion, or the efficacy of the spirits in moving the body.

The Doctrine of Sense and Sensibility, or the difference betwixt perception and sense.

An Inquiry into the Origin and Form of Light, or the foundation of optics.

The Art of Inventing Arts.

The True Use of Induction in Philosophy.

The Art of Indication or Direction in Philosophy.

A Learned or Sagacious Kind of Experience, different from the vulgar, and leading to the direct improvement of arts.

A Particular Topical Invention, directed by the light of leading questions, or proper heads of inquiry.

The Doctrine of Idols, or a detection and confutation of the prejudices, false conceptions, and errors of the mind.

A New Engine, or helps for the mind corresponding to those of the hand.

An Appendix to the Art of Judgment, assigning the kinds of demonstration proper to every subject.

An Interpretation of the Marks, Signatures, or Impressions of things.

A Philosophical Grammar, or an account of the various properties of different languages, in order to form one perfect pattern of speech.

The Traditive Lamp, or the proper method of delivering down the sciences to posterity.

The Doctrine of Prudence in private discourse, or colors of good and ill.

A collection of Sophisms, with their confutations.

A collection of studied Antithets, or short and strong sentences, on both sides of the question, in a variety of subjects.

A collection of lesser Forms of Speech, for all the occasions of writing and speaking.

Sober Satire, or the insides of things.

The Georgics of the Mind, or the means of procuring the true moral habit of virtue.

An Account of the Characters or Natures of Persons.

The Doctrine of the Affections, Passions, or Perturbations of the Mind.

The Secretary to the Uses of Life, or the doctrine of various occasions.

The Doctrine of Business, or books upon all kinds of civil employments, arts, trades, etc.

Self-policy, the doctrine of rising in life, or the means of advancing a man's private fortune.

The Military Statesman, or the political doctrine of enlarg­ing the bounds of empire.

The Doctrine of Universal Justice, or the fountains of equity.

The Moderator in Divinity, or the true use of human reason in the business of revelation.

The Degrees of Unity in Religion adjusted, with a view to preserve the peace of the Church.

The First Flowerings of the Scriptures, or a set of short, sound, and judicious notes upon particular texts, tending to use and practice.


The Art of Discourse

37  In all kinds of speech, either pleasant, grave, severe, or ordinary, it is convenient to speak leisurely, and drawn out rather than hastily; because hasty speech confounds the memory and oftentimes, besides unseemliness, drives a man either to not know what to say or to unseemly stammering, harping upon that which should follow; whereas a slow speech confirms the memory, adds a conceit of wisdom to the hearers, besides a seemliness of speech and countenance. To desire in discourse to hold all arguments is ridiculous, wanting true judgment; for no man can be exquisite in all things.

To use commonplace discourse, and to lack variety is both tedious for the listeners, and shows a shallowness of conceit: therefore it is good to vary, and suit speeches with the present occasions; and to have a moderation in all our speeches, especially in jesting of religion, state, great persons, weighty and important business, poverty, or any thing deserving pity.

It is necessary to use a steadfast countenance, not wavering with action, as in moving the head or hand too much—which shows a fanciful, light, and fickle operation of the spirit, and consequently a mind like the gestures. It is sufficient, with leisure, to use a modest action in either countenance or gesture. . .

To dwell on many circumstances before you come to the subject is wearisome; and to use none at all is only blunt.



38  I have often thought upon death, and I find it the least of all evils. All that which is past is as a dream; and he that hopes or depends upon the future dreams while awake. So much of our life as we have discovered is already dead; and all those hours which we share—even from the breasts of our mother until we return to our grandmother the earth—are part of our dying days; of which even this is one and those that succeed it are of the same nature, for we die daily. And as others have given place to us, so we must in the end give way to others.

I know many wise men, that fear to die; for the change is bitter, and flesh wishes to re­fuse to try it: besides the expectation brings terror, and that exceeds the evil. But I do not believe that any man fears to be dead, but only the stroke of death: and such are my hopes, that if heaven be pleased, and nature renews my lease for just another twenty one, I, without asking longer days, shall be strong enough to acknowledge without mourning that I was conceived as a mortal.

39  I might say much of the commodities that death can sell a man; but briefly, death is a friend of ours, and he that is not ready to entertain him is not at home. Whilst I am, my ambition is not to move faster than the tide; I have but so to make my interest of it, as I may account for it; I would wish nothing but what might better my days, nor desire any greater place than in the front of good opinion. I make not love to the continuance of days, but to the goodness of them; nor wish to die, but refer myself to my hour, which the great Dispenser of all things hath appointed me.



The text is adapted from the following sources, with minor changes in words to make the meaning clear to contemporary readers:

1; 2-6; 7-26, 34-36 Advancement of Learning and Novum Organum by Francis Bacon. Revised Edition P.F. Collier and Son, New York, 1900. pp xi; 319; 323, 20, 320, 322, 328, 24, 24, 23, 315, 36, 37, 315, 315, 316, 135, 316, 316, 318, 316, 316;

 27-33,37-39 The Works of Francis Bacon, Volume 3, Parry & McMillan, Philadelphia, 1859. III: p 339: I: p. 131.

  Web Pages

The Works of Sir Francis Bacon

The Complete Essays of Francis Bacon

Adaptation and selection Copyright © Rex Pay 2000